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IN Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the United States SupremeCourt decided three issues: (1) whether the word “person,” as used inthe Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) included
for-profit corporations; (2) whether the Department of Health and
Human Services’ (“HHS”) contraceptives mandate (“mandate”) substan-
tially burdened the exercise of religion under RFRA’s standards; and (3)
whether HHS’ contraceptives mandate furthered a compelling govern-
mental interest and satisfied RFRA’s least-restrictive-means require-
ment.1 The Court found that closely held, for-profit corporations did fit
within the definition of “person”; the mandate, applied to the plaintiffs’
closely held corporations, substantially burdened the exercise of religion;
and the mandate, although it served a compelling governmental interest,
did not meet the least-restrictive-means requirement.2
This holding resulted in the plaintiffs, two religious families and owners
of three different for-profit corporations, receiving an exemption from
paying for four types of contraceptives in their employees’ insurance
plans, leaving the responsibility of providing these contraceptives to the
Government or the insurance companies.3 While the dissent believes the
majority’s decision will result in employers cloaking their discriminatory
practices under the fac¸ade of religious exercise, this fear is unfounded
because it is based on a misunderstanding of the Court’s narrow holding.
The majority did not directly address the discrimination concern in their
opinion, but the Court could have strengthened its reasoning by pointing
out that its decision demonstrated the need to evaluate RFRA claims on
a case by case basis, which will inevitably result in narrow holdings, in
order to prevent both employment discrimination and religious
discrimination.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2016; B.A. in Anthroplogy,
Princeton University June 2012. I would like to thank Professor Butler for her helpful
comments in writing this note. I would also like to thank my husband, Jack, for his com-
ments, edits, and constant support.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
2. Id. at 2759-60.
3. Id. at 2782.
307
308 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
In 1993, Congress enacted RFRA, which set out a test for the courts to
use in evaluating federal laws that “substantially burden a person’s exer-
cise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applica-
bility.”4 This law allows the Government to substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion only if the burden “is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”5 In 2010, Congress en-
acted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), which
requires employers with fifty or more full-time employees to offer pre-
ventative care and screenings for women.6 This coverage includes “[a]ll
Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive meth-
ods,” and four of these contraceptives “may have the effect of preventing
an already fertilized egg from developing any further.”7
It is these four contraceptives that the plaintiffs, the Hahn and Green
families, objected to paying for in their employees’ health insurance plans
because the families “believe that life begins at conception,” and provid-
ing these contraceptives would violate their religion as they would be aid-
ing in the termination of human life.8 The Greens run two family
businesses, Hobby Lobby and Mardel, and the Hahns run one, Cones-
toga.9 Both families exercise exclusive control and ownership of their
businesses.10 Furthermore, all three businesses operate—according to
their statements of purpose—under Christian principles, and Hobby
Lobby and Mardel close on Sundays as a matter of religious conviction.11
The Hahns and their business Conestoga sued HHS and other federal
agencies under RFRA and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
for an injunction of the contraceptive mandate only for the four “contra-
ceptives that may operate after the fertilization of an egg.”12 The district
court denied the requested injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed be-
cause it found for-profit, secular corporations could not exercise religion
under the First Amendment or RFRA.13 The Greens, Hobby Lobby, and
Mardel filed a similar lawsuit. The district court also denied a preliminary
injunction, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the two businesses
operated by the Greens were “persons” under RFRA who could exercise
religion.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to both cases and de-
cided the RFRA claims, finding it unnecessary to address the First
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2011).
5. Id.
6. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762.
7. Id. at 2762-63.
8. Id. at 2765-66.
9. Id. at 2764-65.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2764-66.
12. Id. at 2765.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2766.
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Amendment claims.15
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
The Supreme Court first decided RFRA applies to laws or regulations
governing the activities of closely held, for-profit corporations.16 The
Court pointed out that when a right such as the Fourth Amendment pro-
tection of privacy is extended to corporations, the rights of people are
protected (“the privacy interests of employees and others associated with
the company”).17 Therefore, protecting the plaintiff corporations’ relig-
ious liberty rights “protects the religious liberty of the humans who own
and control those companies.”18 RFRA does not define “person,” so the
Court looked to the Dictionary Act, which includes corporations under
the definition of “person.”19 The Court also noted that it has evaluated
claims brought by nonprofit corporations under RFRA; consequently, it
is not logical to define “person” as including some corporations and not
others.20
While the dissent and HHS argued a for-profit corporation could not
“exercise religion,” the majority explained that corporations are formed
“for any lawful purpose or business.”21 Business owners may start compa-
nies not only to make a profit, but also to further their religious beliefs
and objectives, which both the Hahns and Greens claim to do as evi-
denced by their respective companies’ statements of purpose.22 Finally,
the Court limited its holding to closely held, for-profit companies, like
those of the plaintiffs, which are not publicly traded, but instead are con-
trolled by the members of a single family, all of whom subscribe to the
same religious beliefs.23 The Court found that this negated the danger,
cited by the dissent and HHS, that it would be difficult to ascertain the
beliefs of a corporation.24
The second issue the Court decided was that the HHS contraceptive
mandate substantially burdened the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion.25 Both
the majority and dissent recognized that the Hahns and Greens sincerely
believed being complicit in the provision of the four contraceptives vio-
lated their religious convictions.26 However, the dissent argued that the
connection between providing health insurance for all of the contracep-
15. Id. at 2785.
16. Id. at 2767.
17. Id. at 2768.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2768-69.
21. Id. at 2770-71.
22. See id. at 2771 (“the laws of [the states in which the plaintiffs’ corporations reside]
permit for-profit corporations to pursue ‘any lawful purpose’ or ‘act,’ including the pursuit
of profit in conformity with the owners’ religious principles.”).
23. See id. at 2774.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 2775.
26. Id. at 2775, 2798.
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tives and the company’s religious objection, the destruction of an embryo,
was too attenuated because the female employee, not the company,
would purchase the contraceptive.27 The Court disagreed and said this
argument asked whether the religious belief was reasonable, instead of
the proper question under RFRA, which is whether the mandate imposes
a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ ability to run their businesses in
accordance with their religious beliefs and convictions.28 According to the
majority, whether a religious belief is reasonable or not is irrelevant, and
the Court must only decide whether the religious belief is sincerely
held.29
As the majority noted, the financial consequences for refusing to com-
ply with the ACA contraceptives mandate were significant. Noncompli-
ance would result in penalties of $475 million per year for Hobby Lobby,
$33 million per year for Conestoga, and $15 million per year for Mardel.30
Because both sides agreed on the fact that the plaintiffs sincerely held
their belief, and that they faced severe financial consequences for non-
compliance, the Court concluded the mandate placed a substantial bur-
den on the plaintiffs’ religious exercise.
The final issue decided by the Court was whether HHS showed that the
mandate was in furtherance of a compelling interest and was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.31 The Court assumed the
Government has a compelling “interest in guaranteeing cost-free access
to the four challenged contraceptive methods,” but found that the man-
date failed the least-restrictive-means test.32 As the majority pointed out,
there are several alternatives that would “be less restrictive of the plain-
tiffs’ religious liberty.”33 For example, the Government could assume the
cost or extend the same exemption of the mandate it already extended to
non-profit corporations without any cost-sharing requirements.34 The dis-
sent argued that forcing the government to pay for these contraceptives
would impede women’s access to them and give employers the ability to
cite any religious objection for discriminating against its employees.35 The
Court ultimately found this reasoning unpersuasive because a workable
exemption for non-profits already existed and that exemption could eas-
ily be extended to the plaintiffs who demonstrated a sincerely held
belief.36
27. Id. at 2799.
28. Id. at 2778.
29. Id. at 2778-79.
30. Id. at 2775-76.
31. Id. at 2779; See 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1(b) (2011).
32. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2780, 2782.
35. Id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2782 (majority opinion).
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III. ANALYSIS
While the majority made many compelling and logical arguments for
the three issues it addressed, it failed to engage seriously with the dis-
sent’s concern that the case’s holding would allow employers to discrimi-
nate against their employees under the guise of religious convictions.37
However, the Court simply applied the applicable statute, a statute that
actually avoids the discrimination about which the dissent worries, mak-
ing the dissent’s primary flaw its misinterpretation of the holding’s ramifi-
cations. If the majority had critically assessed the discrimination concern,
it would have reached the same holding, but with a more robust discus-
sion of the consequences, or lack thereof, of this case in the field of em-
ployment discrimination.
The majority should have pointed out RFRA’s ability to address the
dissent’s fears, but instead the Court quickly discarded any discrimination
concerns. Taking racial discrimination as an example, and promptly dis-
missing the point, the majority only says that already existing “prohibi-
tions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored” to achieve the
Government’s compelling interest in “providing equal opportunity in the
workforce without regard to race.”38 The Court, at least explicitly, offers
no further reasoning as to why this fear of future racial discrimination
masked as religious belief is unwarranted.39 The majority does at one
point address HHS and the dissent’s concern of the possible flood of liti-
gation by employers seeking exemptions after this case, but simply says
HHS points to no evidence that would substantiate this claim.40 The
Court had a better answer to the dissent’s criticism, and much of it is
buried within other sections of the majority’s opinion, mainly its applica-
tion of RFRA, which shows the Court applied the statute’s framework to
the case at hand, resulting in the interests of both the employers and em-
ployees being met without discrimination against either party.
The availability of the RFRA test convinced the Court of the un-
remarkable nature of its decision, a decision they viewed as a simple ap-
plication of the statute. “The wisdom of Congress’s judgment on this
matter is not our concern. Our responsibility is to enforce RFRA as writ-
ten, and under the standard that RFRA prescribes, the HHS contracep-
tive mandate is unlawful.”41 The dissent appeared not just to reject the
application of RFRA’s framework, but “its fundamental objection to the
claims of the plaintiffs [was] an objection to RFRA itself.”42 The majority
only saw itself applying RFRA’s test to the particular question before the
Court, leaving the employees with viable alternatives to achieve their in-
terests without having to assess the employers’ abstract religious objec-
37. Id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2783 (majority opinion).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2785.
42. Id. at 2784.
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tion, and therefore not opening the door to future claims that would
result in discrimination.
One reason the application of RFRA is an effective means of avoiding
discrimination is because the law does not require courts to assess relig-
ious beliefs; if it did, courts would be the agents of discrimination against
plaintiffs in deciding whose beliefs were valid and whose were unreasona-
ble. The majority points out this weakness in the dissent’s argument:
“HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their be-
liefs are flawed.”43 The Court then claims it is not the business of the
courts to assess “the plausibility of a religious claim.”44 While the dis-
sent’s concern for future litigation arises, in part, from the difficulty of
assessing religious objections, the majority explains courts have no need
to do so because RFRA only requires the court to evaluate whether the
belief is sincerely held and substantially burdened, a much easier and less
philosophical determination.45 The dissent’s claim that any far-fetched re-
ligious objection could serve as a pretext for discrimination is unsup-
ported because the means for weeding out these claims are not the
evaluation of their reasonableness or pretextual nature, but the use of
RFRA’s compelling interest and least-restrictive-means tests.46
Not only does RFRA parse out possible discriminatory claims, it aims
to avoid discrimination by critically analyzing both parties’ interests to
see if they are mutually exclusive or not. As the concurring opinion by
Justice Kennedy articulates, the American community is “a rich mosaic of
religious faiths,” but the exercise of religious beliefs may not “unduly re-
strict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own inter-
ests.”47 The majority is not saying religion will always win, but instead
when religious objections and employee interests can co-exist under
RFRA, they must. RFRA provides a comprehensible framework, using
the least- restrictive-means-test, for evaluating these interests to assure
there is no undue discrimination against either the employer for holding
religious beliefs or against the employee who may not have a benefit paid
for by the employer who refuses to violate his or her faith.48
Although the majority did not articulate their analysis of the “least-
restrictive-means test” in future employment discrimination terms, their
conclusion as to that issue directly addresses the dissent’s fears.49 It ap-
pears the Court did not worry about implicitly approving discrimination
because no discrimination would actually occur in this case, nor would it
occur in future cases for the same reasons.50 The Court decided the
43. Id. at 2778.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); See id. at 2774-75 (majority opinion).
46. See id. at 2774 (majority opinion) (speaking of the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000, RFRA’s “sister statute,” the majority says “Congress was
confident of the ability of the federal courts to weed out insincere claims”).
47. Id. at 2786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. See 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1(b) (2011).
49. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
50. See id. at 2783.
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Hahns and the Greens were not compelled to pay for the four contracep-
tives in question, in part, because their female employees would still have
access to these contraceptives through the available alternatives.51 In fu-
ture cases, the presence of readily available alternatives will similarly
cause the Government to lose its case under the least-restrictive-means
test and also ensure there is no discrimination as the employees will have
their interests met by the alternative options.
Furthermore, the dissent’s trepidation over employment discrimination
appears to stem from the uncertainty of the Court’s holding as precedent
for future cases because of its narrow scope.52 The dissent makes a slip-
pery slope argument, asking whether the Court’s ruling would extend to
Jehovah’s Witnesses who did not want to cover blood transfusions or
Scientologists who did not want to pay for antidepressants.53 After listing
other possible religious objections to medications, the dissent states that
simply evaluating these situations on a case by case basis in the future
offers little help “for the lower courts bound by today’s decision.”54 This
argument is neither logical nor persuasive because the lack of an easily
followed precedent does not give rise to a legitimate concern that other
religious employers will use the very narrow holding to discriminate
against their employees. In fact, the narrowness does just the opposite—it
bars future employers, particularly those who do not have closely held
corporations, from making broad religious objections. The dissent seems
unwilling to take future RFRA claims with their own facts and do the
difficult task of balancing the two interests at stake, which is what RFRA
requires.
At the same time, the dissent is in essence criticizing the Court for not
going far enough with its narrow holding while also accusing the Court of
going too far in its “decision of startling breadth [where] the Court holds
that . . .corporations. . .can opt out of any law. . .they judge incompatible
with their sincerely held religious beliefs.”55  The dissent says the major-
ity’s holding implies “RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit cor-
poration’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation
may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owners’ relig-
ious faith.”56 The majority itself claims “[o]ur decision should not be un-
derstood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily
fail if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs.”57 The Court’s deci-
51. See id. at 2782 (“The principal dissent identifies no reason why this accommoda-
tion would fail to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the contraceptive
mandate, and there is none. Under the accommodation, the plaintiffs’ female employees
would continue to receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-ap-
proved contraceptives”).
52. Id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 2787.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2783 (majority opinion).
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sion leaves room for a different outcome given different facts.58 The ma-
jor flaw in the dissent is its contradictory complaints of the narrow and
broad holding, both of which cannot be true.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, the dissent’s concern that the “extraordinary religion-based
exemptions [the] decision endorses” is a false premise upon which the
concern for future employment discrimination emerges.59 The majority
should have addressed the fact that because the dissent’s premise is un-
tenable, so is its conclusion. Perhaps because there was a legal framework
passed by Congress and the majority’s opinion led to both the employers’
ability to exercise their religious beliefs and the employees’ ability to ac-
cess the four contraceptives in question, the Court found it unnecessary
to address the dissent’s concern of future employment discrimination.
The mere fact of a slippery slope does not negate the limited nature of
the Court’s holding or seriously call into question another court’s ability
to repeat the same RFRA analysis and come out with a different conclu-
sion where the employer does not receive such an exemption. Only en-
gaging in this difficult task over and over again can ensure that both an
employer’s religious rights and the employees’ rights are both taken seri-
ously and protected.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
